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Introduction 
It is a common complaint among Muslim civil society organisations and activists that their 
presence in British politics is misconceived. For example, and notwithstanding a broader 
commitment to pluralism in British politics, activists who mobilize on the basis of Muslim 
religious identities often encounter the charge that they foster sectarian divisions.1 Hence 
following his victory in the Bradford West by-election, a salient charge was that George 
Galloway’s success was the outcome of a homogeneous Muslim voting block What was less 
immediately noted was the role of young voters and disenchantment with Labour’s alleged 
exploitation of kinship networks (biraderi), factors largely passed over by commentators 
generally supportive of Muslim identity politics (e.g., Hasan 2012). Right-wing 
commentators meanwhile converged on the view that Galloway’s success showed ‘that 
sectarian politics are now alive and well in Britain’ (Murray 2012) and that British Muslims 
eagerly responded when they were addressed ‘not as primarily British citizens but solely as 
Muslims’ (Pollard 2012). As an example for the ‘ugly alliance between the far left and 
Islamists’, Abhijit Pandya (2012) pointed to ‘groups like Operation Black Vote and the 
Muslim Public Affairs Committee [that] are busy encouraging such communities to vote 
along racial and religious lines.’ 
There is of course a prevailing political context here. Organisations that attempt to mobilize 
minority citizens by appealing, in one way or another, to collective concerns, interests and 
identities, find themselves in situations where they have to respond to representations that 
they believe do not adequately characterize their objectives, subjectivities and the reality of 
Muslim participation in British politics more generally. In response, an increasing number of 
advocacy groups are concerned to repudiate what they perceive to be misperceptions of 
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Muslim agency as exceptional and impossible to accommodate. Frequently, these 
organisations and initiatives desire to project and practice civic identities, to demonstrate 
their normality and a commitment to the ‘common good’.  
This article focuses on such efforts in the context of the general election 2010. It draws on 
qualitative research into campaigns of the most active mobilizing actors: the Muslim Council 
of Britain (MCB), ENGAGE, the Muslim Public Affairs Committee (MPAC) the Youelect 
initiative, and, as a non-Muslim group, the aforementioned Operation Black Vote (OBV). It 
explores how these organisations positioned themselves in response to experiences of 
‘misrecognition’.2 This conceptual focus allows us to explore one of the most pertinent 
characteristics of Muslim political agency in Britain today: how actors respond to perceived 
pressures, make claims and project identities in opposition to alleged misperceptions or the 
refusal to acknowledge their desired self-descriptions. We employ the concept of 
misrecognition to help theorise these processes.  
More precisely, this article draws on a set of qualitative interviews with representatives of the 
organisations listed above that were conducted in early 2012; it supplements the accounts of 
these activists with a study of campaign materials published by these organisations in the run-
up to the general election. It begins by locating the concept of misrecognition within 
normative and political theory (1). It then outlines fives ‘modes’ that are characteristic for 
how Muslim political actors conceive of misrecognition (2). In the following, the article 
works through three significantly contested issues that are highlighted by and require a 
response from all organisations under investigation: minority representation (3), the character 
of ‘the Muslim Vote’ (4) and political neutrality (5). It concludes by suggesting that 
misrecognition represents a meaningful perspective on Muslim politics that needs be 
expanded in order to conceive of creative, not just reactive, modes of political agency. 
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1. The Concept of Misrecognition 
Beginning with our theoretical concern, misrecognition is a term that is obviously relational 
to recognition, and the two most prominent proponents of the latter concept began their 
dialogues with the same source. Charles Taylor’s essay on ‘The Politics of Recognition’ 
(1994) and Axel Honneth’s book Kampf um Anerkennung (1994) engage with – both 
appropriating and departing from – Hegel’s philosophical system. For example, shadowing 
Hegel’s account of the three arenas of recognition (family, civil society and the state), 
Honneth argues that there are three modes of recognition, which he refers to as love, respect 
and esteem. Love is the mode of recognition which, all being well, we receive from our small 
circle of significant others. Respect is that mode which we experience when our fellow 
citizens regard us as rights-bearing individuals. Esteem is the sort of recognition we enjoy 
when we are valued for our distinct contributions to society’s collective goals. Taylor, 
meanwhile, offers a philosophical and historical account of how recognition reflects ‘a vital 
human need’ (1994, 26), one crucial to our ability to become full human agents. This claim 
stems from the Hegelian premise of the fundamentally dialogical character of human identity 
which Taylor elaborated on in Sources of the Self (1989). That is, one can become a self, 
capable of self-understanding and achieving ‘self-definition’, only in relation to other 
conversation partners, within ‘webs of interlocution’ (1989, 32, 36). 
The two leading authors on recognition spend relatively little time elaborating on the 
circumstances of misrecognition (cf. Martineau, Meer and Thompson 2012; Meer, Martineau 
and Thompson 2012). For Taylor, the concept is a relatively taken-for-granted inversion of 
recognition. To those affected, he argues, misrecognition inflicts “real damage, real 
distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning 
or contemptible picture of themselves” (Taylor 1994, 25). Honneth offers a marginally more 
sustained elaboration of misrecognition, regarding it as ‘the withdrawal of social recognition, 
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in the phenomena of humiliation and disrespect’ (Fraser and Honneth 2003, 134). Yet in both 
cases the specifically political conditions for this harm to occur, or how those that are 
misrecognized act in response, is left largely unexplored. Taking issue with, among other 
things, the lack of concern for political agency in such theorizations of recognition, Saba 
Mahmood (2005, 18, emphasis in original) highlights the ‘capacity for action that specific 
relations of subordination create and enable’. Misrecognition, following her, is an unhelpful 
device if it is (solely) concerned with the assertion of preexisting and stable identities that are 
articulated against social stigma. Instead, we should explore the subjectivities that emerge 
within social environments of subordination and misrecognition.  
Regardless of the philosophical implications of Mahmood’s position, this would require us to 
be contextually specific about the types of self-understandings that emerge in the case of 
minority politics, and so not to prejudge modalities of agency on the basis of uniform or 
detached conceptions of ‘the’ minority experience. It also means paying attention to how 
political identities and claims are adapted in conjunction with, rather than just asserted 
against, social biases. Yet it still remains the case that a significant number of political actors 
that engage with such biases do conceive of their social contexts as characterized by 
misrecognition and of themselves as misrecognized. Our discussion of their experience  
serves as a starting point for contextual inquiries into the struggle for recognition.  
More recently, there has been a political turn in understanding misrecognition, as a  means to 
understand and contextualize political mobilizations that span different categories of political 
recognition: from seeking statehood (Seymour 2012; Staples 2012) to pursing participation in 
the public sphere as co-citizens (Lægaard 2012; Martineau 2012; Meer 2012). Indeed, we 
suggest that this is what makes it helpful to our interest in strands and processes that make up 
Muslim political mobilizations. Rather than being a ‘master concept’ to conceive of justice 
and human self-realization, it can be an empirically sensitive instrument in analyzing debates 
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about formal participation and representation. As Honneth (1994, 274) himself suggests, it 
can deliver a ‘critical, interpretive framework’ to identify social conditions and discourses 
employed by actors that participate in concrete social struggles. 
As such, misrecognition can provide for an empirically sensitive perspective. What actors, or 
groups of actors, do in response to the experience of misrecognition will depend on the type 
of bias they encounter and the discursive and material opportunities that are available to 
them. Unless they acquiesce or resign, misrecognized actors will seek redress and propose 
alternative truths that they wish to see socially acknowledged. Significantly, this might entail 
a challenge not only to individual biases or misperceptions but to social rules and 
conventions. Thus, James Tully (2000, 479) suggests that when 
a group puts forward a demand for recognition they seek to disclose the 
misrecognition or non-recognition in the existing rule of mutual recognition 
of themselves and others, to persuade others it is unjust and intolerable, and 
to display a preferred alternative.  
Tully points to acts of ‘disclosure’ in which actors seek to defeat misrecognition not just by 
articulating alternative narratives but by embodying alternative selves. Such alternatives may 
then be registered (or not) by majority actors that revise their understanding of the minority in 
question. Ideally, it may lead to the revision of social conventions and established perceptual 
frameworks of misrecognition, such as those that account for the sensationalizing coverage in 
parts of the British press. Yet even when the desired form of recognition is not forthcoming, 
the proposition of alternatives might be empowering in its own right and there are numerous 
examples for how the assertion of oppositional identities, such as that of Black Power 
beginning in the 1960s, against the social mainstream has been experienced as profoundly 
positive by minority groups in question.  
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Drawing on this suggestions about reciprocal relationships in the struggle for recognition, 
there are three moments that we wish to highlight and that are open to contextually sensitive 
inquiry: (i) initial experiences of misrecognition motivate (ii) the disclosure of alternative 
truths or the embodiment of alternative identities that are then (iii) socially acknowledged, or 
not. In the following, we focus on the first two of these moments. We wish to specifically 
address dilemmas of political agency and civic positioning in a difficult environment and thus 
examine how Muslim civic organisations respond to, are bound by and seek to transcend 
socio-political misrecognition. 
2. Misrecognising Muslim Agency  
Here, we discuss some of the constraints that characterize negative responses to the Muslim 
presence in British politics and outline on that basis five ‘modalities’ of misrecognition (see 
Table 1 below). In a first step, these modalities are loosely delineated, drawing on previous 
cases and discursive possibilities .We will then, in following sections, apply and develop 
these modalities in a discussion of three contested cases  
As a general proposition, an equitable place for ethnic minority populations in British politics 
is relatively undisputed. However, progressives as well as conservatives frequently disavow 
political expressions that emphasise specific minority markers or that prioritize minority 
requests (at the expense, for example, of overarching ideas or ideologies that are said to 
‘cover’ or ‘subsume’ such requests). As already suggested, it is in particular the critique of 
‘identity politics’ around which left- and right-wing commentators coalesce. For example, 
Douglas Murray (2010), the former director of the neo-conservative Centre for Social 
Cohesion, chastised in particular the Tories for appealing to Muslim voters and remarked that 
all 
three of the major parties continue to think that the identity-group era of 
politics is still alive and well; that as part of the multiculti [sic] mindset it is 
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inevitable that you say different things to different “communities”; and that 
therefore you can say anything at all to get the alleged “Muslim community” 
to vote for you.  
On the Left, critics of ‘identity politics’ see disempowering effects of the political appeal to 
ethnic or religious identities for the communities in question and to how this emphasis 
reinforces hierarchies and strengthens conservative forces. In a manifesto, the New 
Generation Network (2006), for example, argued that in ‘a throwback to the colonial era, our 
politicians have chosen to appoint and work with a select band of representatives and by 
doing so treat minority groups as monolithic blocks, only interested in race or faith based 
issues rather than issues that concern us all”. This critique, and the request to ‘end communal 
politics’, is particularly directed political operations that mobilizes kinship ties, biraderi in 
the case of Pakistani communities (see Werbner 1990; Anwar 1995; Purdam 2001), which 
have recently been identified as one reason for the wide-spread disenchantment leading to 
George Galloway’s victory in Bradford West (Akthar 2012). 
While specific features of minority mobilizations, for example on the basis of informal 
relationships between community leaders and the Labour Party, are perhaps particularly 
deserving of critique, the attack on ‘identity politics’ has an unfortunate tendency to conflate 
phenomena and stigmatize minority participation altogether. Race- or faith-based 
mobilizations that happen to be bottom-up, do not perpetuate communal hierarchies and 
aren’t manipulated by vested interests, at least not more than any other type of political 
assertiveness on the basis of shared concerns, are seen as an anomaly or ruled out as 
impossible. Identity politics tends to be identified with ‘monolithic’ groups, and there is, 
hence, a risk that this line of critique is selectively used to marginalise and silence some 
groups, especially new entrants. In fact, a type of misrecognition (1a) that is identified by 
some of our respondents in this research is characterized by the rejection, often selectively, of 
group- or identity-based mobilizations in the case of Muslim political actors. 
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[add Table 1 about here] 
Such imbalances in the rejection of ethnic minority claims apply in debates about formal 
representation, too. Commentators criticize the concern with heightening ethnic minority 
representation for its single-minded pursuit of superficial similarity. Yet the meaning of 
political representation, and in particular the balance between is largely open (see Pitkin 
1967; Phillips 1995; Young 2000). As Hannah Pitkin (1967, 210) suggests, the act of 
representation can be conceived in an abstract and disconnected way, akin to the Burkean 
‘representation of unattached interests’, or as a particular and intimate connection where 
close ties between representatives and represented are necessary because ‘interest, wants, and 
the like [are] definable only by the person who feels or has them’. It is not the case that in 
British parliamentary democracy, or more generally, the role of elected representatives is 
clearly conceived to follow either of these models; different expectations exist and claims can 
be modelled according to divergent understandings of what representatives are for and what 
representation is about. The suggestion that a Muslim ‘politics of presence’ or any other 
concern to increase the formal representation of specific minority groups is either exceptional 
or exceptionally problematic constitutes a related type of the same kind of misrecognition 
(1b). The conditions for the civic self-constitution of post-immigration groups are usually 
fragile and the request that they, sometimes even above all others, approximate idealized 
understandings of citizenship and democratic agency can be, and historically has been, an 
exclusionary device. 
British Muslims are clearly some way beyond exclusion and in the aftermath of the Rushdie 
affair distinct patterns of their political agency became more widely acknowledged (Modood 
1990). Yet it has been suggested that the experience of stigmatization, in the aftermath of the 
Satanic Verses and exacerbated after 9/11, has led to political orientations that are primarily 
reactive and articulate grievances. There is a risk of reductionism in such accounts. British 
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Muslim politics is characterized by diversity and, although the concern to defeat stigmas may 
be widely shared, political objectives differ in line with different religious, strategic and 
ideological commitments and follow distinct grammars of political agency (see O’Toole and 
Gale 2010). While ideological or religious commitments are clearly significant, they are not 
the only predictors of political activism among British Muslims. Some organisations, such as 
the MCB, liaise with decision makers and lobby behind the scenes. Others seek to effect 
political change through public engagement and awareness-raising (e.g., ENGAGE). Others, 
again, operate and mobilize predominantly locally, on the ground and through social 
networking sites (MPAC). The diversity of approaches, political sensibilities and the different 
ways in which religious identities are emphasized or merely play a background role reflects 
heterogeneity. The reluctance to acknowledge this diversity and the dynamism of political 
agency among British Muslims constitutes a second type of misrecognition that we propose 
to explore below (2). 
In a similar manner, the emphasis on grievances means that the proliferation of alternative 
sites of Muslim civil society – in terms of media production and consumption, community 
and religious activism, and arenas for Muslim dissent – risks being ignored. This proliferation 
is considered as evidence of withdrawal rather than political pluralisation of the public 
sphere. Accounts that treat Muslim agency as purely reactive face a related objection. It is 
hardly the case that outside pressures always determine the political agency of marginalised 
groups; at least they usually do not give a good account of motivations and purposes that 
exist beyond the concern to overcome pressures. ‘Excluded groups’, Modood (2005, 159, 
emphasis in original) suggests, ‘seek respect for themselves as they are or aspire to be, not 
simply a solidarity on the basis of a recognition of themselves as victims; they resist being 
defined by their mode of oppression and seek space and dignity for their mode of being.’ 
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As such we have to be sensitive to the emergence of Muslim identities that are adopted and 
deployed in various permutations by many Muslims themselves. A key issue is how this 
‘Muslim-consciousness’ connects to the sorts of ‘civic status’ that Muslims are seeking. The 
types of civic status being referred to include those that have prevailed for other minorities 
under the terms of a peculiarly British multiculturalism, and which has sought to promote 
equality of access and opportunity, and has led to some significant recognition of particular 
minority ‘differences’. In this domain and in arenas of political participation more generally, 
the concern to project political identities is as evident as the desire to overcome pressures. Its 
portrayal as driven by and reducible to grievances, purely reactive to outside pressures and 
devoid of positive political objectives, indicates a third type of misrecognition (3).  
There has been a tendency, moreover, to reject mobilisations on the basis of minority 
identities for its alleged incompatibility with a political orientation towards the ‘common 
good’ (4). A historical account of this position within the Labour Party has been vividly 
brought out by Les Back and John Solomos (1992). In Birmingham Small Heath, the 
contender for the 1992 Labour candidacy – current incumbent Roger Godsiff – was 
challenged at selection meetings by minority candidates. Godsiff enjoyed support from trade 
unions and the national party; his eventual selection, however, was marred by allegations of 
vote-rigging. Godsiff defended his position and suggested that the 
trouble with people trying to become MPs now, they’re trying to become 
MPs because they’re members of an ethnic community, they’re not trying to 
become MPs because they concern the whole of the community and they 
represent a philosophy. They don’t understand that, they need to stop to 
think about it. I have to tell my councillors, some of whom aspire to become 
MPs, that their job is to represent all the constituents they’ve got, and often 
they’re not very successful at it. And that’s sad, so they still are not fully 
integrated into the Labour party, never mind the community. (Interview with 
Roger Godsiff, MP, quoted in Back and Solomos 1992, 11) 
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The suggestion appears to be that in order to be representative – to embody, for example, the 
‘Labour philosophy’ – minority concerns have to be abandoned. It is moreover the 
responsibility of minority politicians to prove their ability to represent: a burden that does not 
usually apply to white politicians, not even in constituencies with significant post-immigrant 
populations, such as Small Heath (43% in 1992). The suspicion, and a related type of 
misrecognition that we explore in the following (4), is that Muslim agency reflects ‘sectarian’ 
interests – a suspicion that can only be appeased through continuous demonstrations of a 
commitment to the ‘common good’. 
A final obstacle, frequently encountered by Muslim political actors, is the difficulty to forge 
alliances as a result of the perceived toxicity of Muslim concerns. It is clear that different 
organisations deal differently with such difficulties. The MCB, for example, has sought to 
establish collaborative relationships across the party-political spectrum. MPAC, on the other 
hand, adopts a more combative posture: while it endorses candidates, it maintains distance 
since the association could potentially be damaging to its endorsees. Considerations about the 
due proximity and distance, as well as neutrality and partisanship, are widely evident in the 
strategic thinking of the mobilizing actors that we have interviewed. The toxicity of the 
Muslim association constitutes on final experience of misrecognition that we investigate in 
the following (5).  
3. The politics of Muslim representation 
It is worth registering at the outset that Muslim activists, particularly those operating with a 
view to the national level, often seem strongly attuned to their political environment and thus 
show considerable reflexivity about dilemmas of formal representation. For example, a 
respondent for The Cordoba Foundation who was involved in the Youelect initiative to 
mobilize Muslim voters highlighted in fairly stark terms one of the problems entailed in a 
mere focus on increasing the parliamentary minority presence:  
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We have one or two Muslim MPs that are absolutely dreadful. They happen 
to be Muslims but actually, they’re dreadful, and most of their positions, you 
know, vis-à-vis the Muslim community, are totally negative. It doesn’t really 
matter that they’re Muslim. (Interview, 9 January 2012) 
The ability to judge candidates on the basis of their policy record rather than their faith, this 
respondent suggested, proved that ‘the Muslim community is issue-based, and not religion-
based’ (Interview, 9 January 2012). Indeed, in the debate about political representation 
activists frequently appear to disavow the concern to heighten the Muslim presence in public 
institutions and highlight sophisticated, issue-based deliberations that they either see at work 
or want to promote among Muslim citizens. It is likely that frequent portrayals of Muslim 
political agency as ‘tribal’ or ‘sectarian’, and thus pre-modern and unenlightened, account for 
the vehemence with which this sophistication among Muslim voters is highlighted. 
This is particularly evident in the reference to Muslim mobilizations against Muslim 
candidates, which were positively highlighted for how ‘ideas’ trumped ‘religion’: MPAC, for 
example, lobbied against Khalid Mahmood’s re-election in Birmingham’s Perry Bar 
constituency and claimed that, while Mahmood had ‘relied on the Muslim vote to keep him in 
power’, we ‘are asking what did he do to stop the illegal wars abroad against Muslims and 
what did he do to stop the demonisation of Muslims in the UK’ (MPAC, 2010). A similar line 
of attack was adopted in the Bradford West by-election where MPAC endorsed Galloway and 
campaigned against Labour’s Imran Hussein: ‘to sweep aside the tired old pattern of voting in 
lack lustre candidates, just because they wear a red rosette’ (MPAC, 2012). Non-Muslims 
were favoured over Muslim candidates, and this was noticed and indeed highlighted as a 
rejection of the unthinking support for Labour and co-religionists that was seen to have 
plagued a previous era of Muslim politics. 
Elaborating on this type of strategic thinking, a respondent for MPAC suggested that ‘we’re 
not just saying: more Muslim MPs. What we’re saying is that non-Muslims MPs also need to 
14  
address the concerns of their Muslim constituents, which we feel in a large extent are being 
ignored’ (Interview, 28 January 2012). For the MCB, a respondent agreed that certain types 
of community politics, which he labelled as the ‘politics of representation’, were detrimental 
to Muslim interests: ‘unity is dissipating where you have vested interests competing for that 
patronage for government access’. This, he suggested, was ‘damaging to the community itself 
and damaging especially to the younger people’ (Interview, 12 January 2012).  
There is some concern, moreover, that an increased Muslim or minority presence in 
institutions might not further the cause of equality but serve to conceal the lack of serious, 
issue-based commitment to racial or religious justice. Commenting on the policy record of 
the current government, a respondent suggested that ‘we have a party that’s beginning to look 
like the people it serves and yet […] race equality [is] going further and further away. 
Multiculturalism [is] being trashed’ (OBV, Interview, 2 February 2012). The concern is that a 
‘politics of presence’ (Phillips 1995) achieves little if it is not accompanied by a critical 
concern with policy-making after elections. While the representative for OBV highlighted the 
value of increased ethnic minority representation, it is striking that Muslim mobilizing 
organisations often appear to accord only secondary, if any, significance to this objective.  
A representative of Youelect highlighted a different set of problems. He pointed to persistent 
doubts about the Britishness of British Muslim, reflecting a situation where Muslim political 
agency was considered sectarian by default and thus incompatible with the ‘common good’: 
‘at the moment, unfortunately, any Muslim, either public figure or otherwise, is first a 
Muslim, then British and therefore his views are first pinned down to his Islamic identity 
rather than the British identity’ (Interview, 25 January 2012). This leads to a situation where 
British Muslims “are asked to make choices that no other groups are asked to make – their 
identity of being Muslim or British first”. A different respondent pointed to his own political 
activism, which included a candidacy for Respect, as an example for a similar experience of 
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misrecognition: ‘One of the most common questions that came my way was, you know, “If 
you decided to do this, why don’t you go and establish a Muslim party?”’ (Interview, 9 
January 2012). His response would be that ‘we don’t need a Muslim party, we’re calling for 
Muslims to be part of society, I don’t want them to stand on one side’.  
Among those involved in the 2010 mobilization there was thus a measure of concern about 
dilemmas of representation and in particular about the way Muslim political actors were 
forced to abjure their Muslimness in order to claim a more encompassing political identity. 
At the same time, the notion that increased representation would provide a remedy to 
inequality that could be achieved without serious and issue-based commitments was widely 
denounced. Arguably, one of the background conditions for this rejection of the ‘politics of 
presence’ was the concern to counter simplistic, but pervasive, representations of Muslim 
politics as pre-modern. There clearly is a strong concern to dispute accounts that equate 
Muslim agency with sectarianism and patronage politics and to emphasize and embody an 
alternative ideal of political sophistication and maturity.  
4. Conceiving of the ‘Muslim Vote’ 
The ‘Muslim Vote’, and how actors of the mobilization conceive of its significance and 
coherence, points in a different direction for our concern with the type of political positioning 
that emerges in contexts of misrecognition. As with formal representation, there are 
ambiguities to consider that are, to some extent, the reflection of a difficult environment. The 
aspiration to ‘normalize’ the participation of British Muslim – to emphasize that a ‘bloc vote’ 
does not exist or to argue that bloc-like voting instincts need to be overcome – is an evident 
concern among all of the respondents in our research. To some extent, this position implies a 
disavowal of ‘groupness’ and leads to strategic contradictions, such as when an emphasis on 
group coherence – such as on the potential for Muslim constituents to ‘swing’ elections – is 
considered strategically advantageous. 
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Highlighting diversity within the ‘Muslim Vote’, organisations involved in the 2010 
mobilization are also identifying features of the political environment that tend to negatively 
affect all British Muslims. An MPAC respondent, for example, suggested that although 
‘there’s a great deal of diversity amongst Muslim communities, always in the plural rather 
than singular [...] we can potentially be all victims of anti-terror legislation, stop and search, 
lengthy detention without charge, these sorts of cases’ (Interview, 28 January 2012). MPAC, 
however, appears to be an outlier among organisations that operate on a national level as it 
tends to frame its activism with reference to the global community of Muslims, the ummah. 
Other organisations appear more cautious in highlighting their encompassing concerns: 
‘oppression, we don’t accept it whether it is against Muslims or against any human being’ 
(Interview, 11 January 2012). Whether injustices that were seen to be impacting in particular 
on British Muslims or Muslims globally should be addressed as Muslim-specific, maybe even 
Muslim-exclusive, is thus somewhat contested. The reference to universal concerns, as it is 
evident in the MCB’s public commitment to ‘working towards the common good’ appears to 
contrasts with MPAC’s emphasis. Since a broad commitment to justice can be inferred from 
Islamic scripture and is evidently shared among the organisations in question, these different 
emphases are not necessarily the result of theological disagreement but of differences about 
how to address target audiences, such as in relation to sensitive foreign policy issues, .and 
how to access mainstream political channels. 
Asked about the extent to which it was possible to speak of a ‘Muslim vote’, a representative 
for Youelect suggested that this was difficult to pinpoint ‘whether the Muslim identity itself 
can determine which way they’re going to vote or their personal factors, like any economic 
profession and country of origin’ (Interview, 25 January 2012). Equally, the Muslim Council 
of Britain’s mobilisations reflect this uncertainty: ‘the needs and aspirations of Britain’s 
Muslim community are no different from those of our fellow citizens – whatever their beliefs 
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or backgrounds’ (MCB, 2005, 3). In 2010, the MCB suggested that ‘the Muslim voter, like 
any other Briton, may well make discerning choices of which their “Muslim identity”, if ever 
there was one, is only a part of a menu of considerations’ (MCB, 2010). Highlighting the 
issue of apathy among young voters, an MCB representative emphasized the importance of 
social trends: ‘We cannot just use Muslim factors when asking ourselves why there are low 
numbers’ (Interview, 12 January 2012). In order to explain patterns of political behaviour 
amongst Muslim voters, the suggestion is that religious identities are one aspect, and not 
necessarily the most important one, that needs to be considered. 
Other activists carefully distinguished between the problematic nature of the ‘Muslim vote’ 
and the legitimate concern to mobilize on the basis of shared Muslim interests. A 
representative of ENGAGE, for example, indicated her uneasiness about the idea of a 
‘Muslim Vote’ ‘because it kind of condenses and generalises and homogenises something 
that I think is a much more complex phenomenon’ (Interview, 3 February 2012). At the same 
time, the respondent indicated that the rejection of this concept placed disproportional on 
Muslims that, too, collectively ‘have the freedom to associate, and by virtue of association 
[to] create organisations’ (Interview, 3 February 2012). Doubts about the coherence of the 
Muslim Vote and necessary awareness into the complexity of British Muslim populations 
should not be used to discredit the mobilization on the basis of shared interests and identities, 
in particular not where similar associational freedoms are selectively withheld while being 
unproblematically granted in the case of non-Muslim social identity groups.  
With regard to the basis on which Muslims should mobilize, a different respondent argued 
along similar lines: ‘I’m not someone who favours religious politics, but I believe that there is 
a call for religious politics at a time when a particular religion is being targeted’ (Interview, 9 
January 2012). The experience of stigmatization, he suggested, had forged a politically 
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salient identity. Yet the respondent equally argued that this political salience should be 
embraced for its positive potentials, rather than being rejected as abnormal or exceptional.  
If religion becomes a catalyst towards people taking part in a democratic 
process, I’m happy with that. If football becomes the catalyst for people to 
take part in something that is, you know, a democratic process, I’m happy 
for that. […] We have, you know, communities or groups with interests, you 
know, whether based on ethnicity, race, religion, colour, creed, hobbies, 
leisure, entertainment, we have that. But we’re talking about it as sort of an 
issue or a problem even simply because of the type, of the context, because 
we’re operating within a context that is defined by 9/11, it’s defined by 7/7, 
it’s defined by terrorism, it’s defined by extremism, it’s defined by wars, it’s 
defined by, you know, all these issues. (Interview, 9 January 2012) 
The stigmatization of Muslim identity in the public sphere, however, meant that some 
organisations treaded more carefully in the framing of their political messages. Youelect, for 
example, chose not to prominently highlight Muslim-specific issues or even identify Muslims 
as its target group on its website. The concern, as the person in charge of the initiative 
suggested, was that anything with ‘the pre-fix of Islam or Muslim has a negative connotation 
immediately and I think there’s a counterproductive element there’ (Interview, 25 January 
2012). In contrast to such concerns about the risk of being dismissed or negatively perceived, 
other organisations appeared to see a certain strategic benefit in highlighting a Muslim 
agenda: an ‘acknowledgement that this is a constituency that they [politicians] cannot ignore’ 
(Interview, 2 February 2012). Despite difficulties in identifying a ‘Muslim Vote’, the appeal 
to this concept could help to increase the public visibility of important issues that would elicit 
a response from campaigning politicians. 
Yet the concern remains an emphasis on the ‘Muslim Vote’ might encourage a certain 
intellectual laziness that was characteristic for how ethnic minority groups had been engaged 
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in the past. The benefit of rejecting simplistic categories and of highlighting the multiplicity 
within groups would be, a respondent for ENGAGE argued, that 
you’re able to populate that space and give voice to all the different 
perspectives that exist in the Muslim community, and it to me can only be a 
very good thing. Because it means that when politicians are looking around 
for a Muslim voice, they’re all automatically confronted with Muslim voices, 
and they have to get over this idea that, you know, a Muslim voice will 
suffice, because they’re confronted with a cacophony of voices and you have 
to deal with that cacophony. And annoying as it is, you have to deal with it, 
because that’s the reality of the British Muslim community. (Interview, 3 
February 2012) 
The diversity among representative organisations would thus reflect the complexity of 
Muslims as a social group and make it more difficult, it is hoped, to apply simplistic 
categories when accounting for British Muslim politics. At the same time, this emphasis on 
multiplicity might constitute a constraint if it hampers, associational freedoms, the 
articulation of shared concern and the use of Muslim electoral significance as a bargaining 
chip. In this case, a context of misrecognition appears to account for a choice between 
unsatisfactory alternatives. 
5. Limits of neutrality and partisanship 
As in debates about conceptions of the ‘Muslim Vote’ and representation, Muslim activists 
have discussed the issue of neutrality in a way that reflects difficult choices. In particular the 
2008 election for London Mayor appears to constitute a crucial case. Widely considered 
sympathetic to their concerns, Labour’s Ken Livingstone benefited from Muslim support, 
such as of a number of well-known activists within the Muslims4Ken initiative. Yet 
Livingstone lost the election and there were some concerns that Boris Johnson had been 
portrayed in a way that would make it more difficult for Muslims to engage in London 
politics. During the campaign, MPAC had urged its supporters to ‘help save us from a Zionist 
20  
Islamophobe becoming Mayor of London’ (MPAC, 2008). Responding to controversial 
statements by Boris Johnson, Muslims4Ken portrayed the Conservative candidate as an 
‘Islamophobe who has insulted and condemned Islam and Muslims’ (cited in Siddiqui, 
2008).3 
In the Guardian, Asim Siddiqui attributed Livingstone’s defeat to the backlash that these 
allegedly inapt efforts these had triggered in particular among the capital’s predominantly 
right-wing press. Siddiqui pointed to the ‘kiss of death’ that the association with 
Muslims4Ken had meant for Livingstone and to ‘the radioactive affect [sic] of reactionary 
Islam in a post-7/7 London. [...] If the very candidate you are endorsing is being damaged by 
your endorsement, then surely it's time for a rethink’ (Siddiqui, 2008). Disputing this account, 
Anas Altikriti took particular issue with the assumption that led Siddiqui to the conclusion 
that it was time to stop ‘to mobilize the ‘Muslim vote’ (Siddiqui, 2008). Altikriti argued that 
‘[t]o suggest that while Muslims can come under collective attack, suspicion and scrutiny as a 
result of crimes committed by a few, but can only defend themselves and fight for their rights 
as individuals, is nothing short of absurd - discriminatory, even’ (Altikriti, 2008). Siddiqui’s 
call for caution, Altikriti argued, merely reflected the stigmatization of British Muslims as a 
‘special case’ and mainstream attempts to discredit any collective articulation of Muslim 
political concerns. 
Strategic considerations about how to mobilize voters in the run-up to the general election, 
two years after Livingstone’s first defeat, seemed to take account of this experience. The 
MCB, for example, which had not endorsed Livingstone, felt encouraged in its position of 
neutrality. An MCB respondent pointed to the significance of the mayoral campaign and 
argued that ‘it wasn't for MCB to endorse’, but rather just to ‘do everything in terms of [..] 
raising issues, but stop short of saying who to put in their ballot box. It's more of service 
facilitation. You make your own mind up’ (Interview, 12 January 2012). The same MCB 
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respondent suggested that the fact that a political campaign had used the notion of a ‘Muslim 
Vote’ in support of a specific candidate constituted an anomaly, similar to Siddiqui (2008) 
who observed that there had been no ‘JewsforBoris’ or ‘GaysforBrian’ campaigns: ‘You 
don’t have a chief rabbi supporting a campaign for Boris’ (MCB, Interview, 12 January 
2012). As a representative umbrella body, the MCB saw it necessary to maintain neutrality - 
despite clear affinities with Ken Livingstone and the Labour party – in order to be able to 
engage with elected representatives regardless of their party background.  
In the campaigns to mobilize Muslim voters in 2010, there were related differences of 
strategic positioning. Youelect, similar to the MCB’s objective, primarily intended to 
familiarize Muslim voters with issues and candidates’ policy record. Just before the election, 
however, it published links to two lists of recommended candidates.4 A respondent 
introduced the rationale for this departure from a more neutral position as follows: 
up until, I think it was the final week or the final two weeks, we didn’t 
favour one over the other.  We just said this is the information, these are the 
priorities, here’s how it works, you go and decide, and you go and decide by 
meeting in your mosques and your community centres, in your homes, by 
talking, by discussing, by holding people accountable, asking them 
questions. […] it was only towards, I think, the last week or 10 days of the 
elections that we started to come up with the idea of the lists, that, okay, fine 
[…] we feel that now is the time when we should say well, listen, there are 
some really very bad candidates and regardless of where they stand on the 
playing fields, they are really, really bad candidates. (Interview, 9 January 
2012) 
A different respondent similarly suggested that ‘people appreciated the fact that we 
[Youelect] weren’t spoon-feeding them or we’re not dictating on what they should be doing, 
we were simply directing them’ and that ‘people did feel empowered through Youelect but 
making sure we didn’t encroach on their personal political space’ (Interview, 25 January 
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2012). Accordingly, the reason why the initiative eventually offered voting recommendations 
was in response to “a lot of push coming from the community itself”. 
By contrast, ENGAGE provided background information without offering recommendations 
and it was suggested that it ‘would never advocate that you vote for this particular candidate, 
because it would be irresponsible to be fair, but also because it’s the local communities that 
determine which candidates they want to elect’ (Interview, 3 February 2012). MPAC, on the 
other hand, was directly targeting in particular those candidates that rejected, for example, for 
their support of the war on Iraq and alleged anti-Muslim positions. Without aiming for 
neutrality in its local interventions, MPAC nonetheless did not endorse any party. It was 
suggested for MPAC that 
we have to be careful about how we position ourselves. So when we 
campaign, we campaign as an independent group, we are not in the pockets 
of anyone that we are trying to promote because what happens is, that can be 
used against them. So we’re backing a candidate, for example from a party, 
his opposition will simply try to portray us as extremists and that this 
candidate is in the pocket of that group. So deliberately what we do is we 
keep distance from any candidate that we endorse. We’re not asking for their 
endorsement. We’re endorsing them. (Interview, 28 January 2012) 
For MPAC, the portrayal as ‘extremist’ was a malign, but given the political climate perhaps 
unavoidable, aspect of their political work: ‘accusing people who are pro-democracy of 
having some kind of violent, extremist agenda. It’s nonsense’ (MPAC, Interview, 28 January 
2012). Accordingly, while being opinionated and often less moderate in their messaging than 
other campaigning actors, MPAC sought to tread carefully in its relationship with the 
politicians that it endorsed and thus to avoid the ‘radioactive effects’ that (allegedly) had 
damaged Ken.  
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Conclusion  
Traversing debates about the Muslim presence in British electoral politics, the article has 
examined ways in which Muslim organisations respond to, are bound by, and transcend the 
experience of misrecognition. Through empirical studies of activist organizations, we draws 
attention to the different ways in which these organisations speak about Muslim identities and 
seek to address Muslim concerns. This occurs within, and so is not immune from, a wider 
political landscape in which questions of minority agency are unsettled. The speech acts and 
positions investigated in this article reflect the attempt to respond to features of this landscape 
and to challenge experiences of misrecognition. 
Although misrecognition is not an untroubled concept, it corresponds to how activists that we 
have interviewed perceive features of the mainstream response to their political presence. We 
have highlighted the need to be contextually sensitive in examining their civic and political 
claims; these are not merely asserted against, but modulated and defined in relation to the 
experience of misrecognition. We contend that this accounts for specific dilemmas such as in 
relation to the recurrent emphasis on maturity and sophistication, which is perhaps the most 
widely shared point of reference in the rhetoric of the various initiatives that we have 
explored. Although this emphasis appears to offer a strong challenge to portrayals of Muslim 
agency as ‘sectarian’ and ‘exceptional’ – along the modalities of misrecognition outlined 
above – it also reflects some ambiguities. While the definition of the ‘Muslim Vote’ as the 
sum of mature, discerning and ideas-based choices may hold strategic benefit, it may also 
limit the room for political manoeuvre, cement a special status and thus impede a 
normalization of the Muslim presence in British political life. The need to counter 
misrecognition through constant reiterations of political maturity constitutes an additional 
burden for Muslim political agency.  
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Yet, although misrecognition has been our focus, we do not suggest that it provides a 
complete account. Indeed, experiences of misrecognition are not adequately understood if 
they are seen to be merely oppressive, limiting spaces for agency and being met by coping 
strategies and a posture of defensiveness. The political positioning that is evident among the 
organisations examined in this article shows that constraints are often creatively negotiated 
and that perceived pressures invite a significant degree of reflexivity and strategic awareness. 
Although these are challenging times for confident expressions of Muslim identities in British 
politics, there are some indications that political actors succeed in projecting political 
subjectivies that are not simply determined by the experience of misrecognition. The 
diversity of attempts to delineate such identities, as is evident among the mobilizations 
examined in this article, might indeed make it more difficult for Muslim political claims to be 
stigmatized as ‘exceptional’ or brushed off and rejected. 
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Table 1: Five modes of misrecognition 
M1 Misrecognising Muslim identity politics as markedly different in kind to 
other identity politics 
 
M2 Misrecognising the dynamic positioning and complexity of Muslim 
identities and concerns 
 
M3 Misrecognising Muslim agency as purely reactive, grievance-based or 
‘pariah politics’ 
 
M4 Misrecognising Muslim concerns as ‘sectarian’, not compatible with an 
orientation towards the common good 
 
M5 Misrecognising Muslim political actors as ‘toxic’ and refusing political 
association  
 
 
